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Abstract 
 
This article reflects on the development and operation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) from the perspective of the post-1989 attempt to extend 
the West European ‘Security Community’ into the wider Europe via processes of both 
EU enlargement and attempts to foster deep integration with former Soviet states. 
Whilst the EU’s strategy towards eastern neighbours should certainly not be taken as 
the sole or even key cause of the ‘insecurity zone’ in and around the EU’s eastern 
frontier, it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that actions such as the ENP and EaP 
have played an important part in these developments. This is an analytical 
contribution rather than a study based on primary research. As well as extending 
existing discussions about the expansion of the European Security Community and 
the application of the ‘Optimum Integration Area’ concept to the EaP countries, the 
article includes a focus on  EU states’ economic relations with Russia which is a 
critical albeit underexplored constraint upon EU ‘eastern’ policy.   
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Introduction 
 
2014 marked the ten year anniversary of the launch of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the five year anniversary of its ‘offspring’ the 
Eastern Partnership (EaP). The war in Georgia in 2008, the present conflict in Ukraine 
with the ensuing annexation of Crimea and breakdown of relations with Russia were 
not expected to be its key results as far as the eastern sphere of the ENP was 
concerned. As Speck (2015), quoting the Economist, noted, “(i)nstead of having built 
a ‘ring of friends,’ the EU is now surrounded by a ‘ring of fire’”. Post-2004 attempts 
to develop close integration with selected post-Soviet countries have certainly not 
achieved the hoped-for spread of the ‘European Security Community’ further east. 
Whilst the EU’s strategy towards eastern neighbours should certainly not be seen as 
the sole or even key cause of the ‘insecurity zone’ in and around the EU’s eastern 
frontier, it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that actions such as the ENP and EaP 
have played an important part in these developments. 
 
This article reflects on the development and operation of the ENP and EaP from the 
perspective of the post-1989 attempt to extend the West European ‘Security 
Community’ into the Wider Europe via processes of both EU enlargement and 
attempts to foster deep integration with former Soviet states. The article identifies 
some key contradictions of the EU’s engagement with the eastern neighbourhood 
including the effects of important inconsistencies in policies towards the EaP 
countries on the one hand and towards Russia on the other. For the latter, this will 
include the implications of the relatively unnoticed but extremely important intensive 
economic interdependence that developed over the last decade or so due to the rapid 
growth of EU exports to the Russian market.  
  
 
Security and Integration in Europe 
 
First, some definitions and a qualification. Post-enlargement Europe refers to  
Europe after the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements and signifies that we are now in the 
era where big-bang expansions of the EU are over and the contours of the European 
project are more or less known, assuming the Western Balkans eventually gain 
accession (see Webber and Stivachtis, 2011). A security community is (Cottey 2007, 
3) “a region where war between constituent states is highly improbable and virtually 
unthinkable. Disputes are resolved via cooperation in framework of common 
institutions”.  After 1945 a potent security community emerged in Western Europe in 
the framework of the process of European integration in the Cold War context. This 
therefore developed as the Deutschian pluralistic variant of security community 
where sovereignty remains primarily at state level though diluted through elements of 
supranational governance. The qualification is to stress that this article is concerned 
with the soft power based security role of the EU and the interplay between 
integration processes and security-building. EU enlargement to Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) was of course accompanied by the hard power based NATO expansion 
into the region as a broader and more explicit component of CEE security policy. 
Apart from the fact that NATO membership is more to do with perceived external 
conventional security threats and a comparison that can be drawn between the 
respective external and internal security roles of NATO and the European integration 
in post-war Western Europe, the ENP/EaP has not in any case been accompanied by 
NATO expansion to the EU’s eastern neighbours. 
 
After 1989 the West European security community began the process of spreading 
eastward and the security-building properties of the EU enlargement process became 
fully apparent during this time. For CEE each step forward in European integration 
was underpinned by conditionality that created the internal conditions for eventual 
membership of the EU and also of the extended European security community. The 
core conditions, otherwise known as the Copenhagen Criteria,  included: transition to 
a market economy able to be competitive in the EU single market; resolution of local 
conflicts/tensions; democracy; and rule of law. Cottey (2007) wrote that “the western 
European security community that emerged during the cold war has outlasted the 
historical circumstances that gave rise to it, and is now the defining feature of the new 
security landscape. The emergence and consolidation of this security community has 
dramatically reduced the likelihood of war in Europe and in doing so fundamentally 
transformed the nature of security in Europe…the Western security community has 
also been a significant stabilising influence in central and eastern Europe, providing a 
powerful impetus for reform and moderation in the region. In the context of 
democratisation and integration with western institutions, central and eastern 
European states have made significant efforts to overcome historic disputes and 
develop new co-operative relationships (both bilaterally and multilaterally)”.  
 
The successful spread of the European Security Community to CEE is the main 
reason why the EU enlargement process has been hailed as the EU’s most successful 
foreign policy ever. Nowadays, in 2016, the sustainability of this achievement is 
however under some question, with notions of ‘disappearing democracy’ and 
‘democratic backsliding’ in new EU member states, especially Hungary and, more 
latterly Poland, having gained traction (Meuller 2014, Sedelmeier 2014, Inotai 2015). 
Even before these setbacks, the gloss of the 2004/2007 enlargement had also worn off 
somewhat with anti-free movement of people rhetoric having been growing steadily 
in several ‘old’ member states, most notably in the UK where immigration was a key 
issue in the June 2016 vote to leave the EU. Nevertheless it is only where the possible 
alternative scenarios for Europe, exemplified by the horrors of the former Yugoslavia 
in the 1990s, have been forgotten that doubts about the enormously positive impact of 
the EU’s eastward expansion could seriously be harboured. Either way, the post-
enlargement success is certainly not being replicated in the EU’s engagement with the 
eastern neighbours. The manifold shortcomings of the ENP itself have been discussed 
at length by many scholars and will not be rehearsed here. Instead, the rest of the 
article focuses on some key reasons why the spread of the European security 
community into the ex-USSR was always bound to be a formidable, if not impossible 
task, regardless of how well the ENP may have been designed and why even a 
strategy based enlargement proper and not just enlargement ‘lite’ may well also have 
run aground. 
 
 
Differentiated ‘Zones’ of Post-communist/Post-enlargement Europe 
 
The EU’s differentiated approach to post-communist Europe became apparent 
almost immediately after the end of the Cold War. By 1993 it was clear that the 
countries comprising CEE were the most privileged group and set apart from the other 
post-communist countries, with membership on the horizon and association 
agreements in place or under negotiation. Europe. Relations with ex-Soviet countries, 
except for the Baltic States, were to be on the basis of Partnership and Association, 
which included neither membership nor deep integration perspectives. The countries 
of the conflict-ridden former Yugoslavia were by and large not engaged (with the 
exception of Macedonia) at all.  By the end of the 1990s these enduring distinctions in 
patterns of EU engagement were reflected in how Europe was seen from the 
perspective of security.  Hyde-Price (2002) identified three differentiated zones: core, 
intermediate and outer. The core zone, Western Europe, was of course itself a stable 
order and established security community. The states comprising the intermediate 
zone - CEE - (essentially those destined to be the 2004/2007 EU entrants) were so far 
less stable than the core zone but essentially peaceful because of the so-called ‘triple 
transformation’ from authoritarianism to democracy, from planned economy to 
market system and from belonging to the Council for Mutual Assistance (CMEA) to 
accession to the EU. The outer zone - the West Balkans and former USSR - was 
clearly going to be an increasingly difficult and challenging task as far as further 
spread of the European security community was concerned. This set of countries 
represented the least stable and most unpredictable zone characterized by slower 
domestic reform, post-conflict or frozen conflict contexts and lagging progress and/or 
uncertain prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration. This at least was the picture in the 
early 2000s when ‘intermediate’ zone states were on the cusp of EU accession.  
 
As far as post-enlargement Europe is concerned, the basic pattern has continued.  The 
modes of engagement with the Western Balkans and ex-Soviet states have undergone 
major change but the main three-way differentiation set in train in the early 1990s has 
been consolidated (see Dangerfield 2007) with varied statuses as far as the European 
security community is concerned.  The first group is CEE, consisting of the eight May 
2004 entrants plus (in spite of later entry and some variation in entry conditions) 
Bulgaria and Romania. These new EU members are now largely absorbed into the 
European security community. The second group consists of the West Balkan states 
all of whom have a membership promise (already honoured in the case of Croatia) 
and are en route to the EU, albeit with differentiated rates of progress. This region is 
also a site also of active EU peacekeeping and other Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) missions, reflecting the complex mix of security problems within that 
region. The third group includes East European states engaged in the ENP and since 
2009, the EaP. These states are still denied a membership promise but have 
progressed to an association perspective. They have been subject to an EU vision or, 
some would say, rhetoric, in which they can develop a relationship short of full 
membership but nevertheless entailing advanced integration with the EU. This group 
is characterised by specific security complications and reform issues connected to the 
Soviet legacy and close relations with Russia. Russia itself has, of course, gone into a 
category of its own, especially since 2004 when it declined to participate in ENP. This 
marked the point in which EU and Russian competition for influence in the ‘shared 
neighbourhood’ began to crystallise (see below).    
 
 
Unintended consequences of Europeanisation – De-stabilisation? 
 
Each of the above-mentioned zones or ‘concentric circles’ has represented a 
progressively more complex and more challenging arena for the EU, yet the premise 
has been that the same method – enlargement or ‘enlargement-lite’ – can work in all 
these different settings. The fact that the EaP zone is now one of instability and crisis, 
at least for Ukraine, has not only finally confirmed the invalidity of that assumption, 
but has fuelled perspectives that the ENP/EaP strategy has actually undermined 
security in Europe by acting as a catalyst for struggle between reform and anti-reform 
elements in EaP countries that escalates into violent confrontation. Speck (2015), for 
example, argues, that while European integration should be of long term benefit – 
economic and political success – it can have de-stabilising effects in the short term. 
This is due to corrupt and self-serving elites that embrace cooperation with the EU to 
get benefits but resist full-blown transformation to liberal democracy and market 
economy. Europeanisation threatens them because it would empower the wider 
population and, inter alia, undermine ‘cronyism’ in the form of patronage and rent-
seeking privileges. As Speck (2015, 2) writes, “it was not by accident that the EU’s 
flag was waving over the maidan and that the refusal of the Association Agreement 
with the EU was what triggered the fall of the old Yanukovich regime”. Thus 
Europeanisation processes seem to run up against deep-seated resistance to reform 
processes needed to forge a path to genuine integration with the EU. When, as in the 
Ukraine case, this results in violent clashes between elites and reformers the EU finds 
itself in the position of having been complicit in the outbreak of conflict but at the 
same time itself lacking the capacity to intervene, especially when Russia becomes 
involved as a key external actor. This is not, course to say, that the EU has no means 
of responding, as the subsequent economic sanctions on Russia, along with the 
subsequent offer of an Association Agreement for Ukraine and EU ‘context’ of the 
German and French role in achieving the 2015 Minsk Agreement show. Nevertheless, 
the EU itself has neither the political capacity nor the ‘hard power’ instruments in 
which to respond or intervene directly in such conflict situations and is always 
restricted to its usual post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building role, with even 
the diplomacy carried out during the conflict phase being carried out by the member 
states rather than the EU per se.  
 
 
 
Contradictory Application of the Enlargement Method 
 
The third reason focuses on the use of the enlargement method even for 
countries without any formal prospect of joining the EU. The consequences of the 
lack of membership offer is well-worn argument which stresses that the absence of 
accession process undermines incentives to reform. Less noticed is incorrect 
sequencing of integration process with EU. According to the ‘classical’ method of EU 
enlargement (see Preston 1997) the first step is a ’classical free trade agreement’ that 
involves basic tariff and quota removal. This is usually accompanied by insistence 
that the countries taking this initial step towards integration with the EU should also 
liberalise trade with each other, for example as per the Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA). In the neighbourhood, the EU reversed the order and offered 
deep integration at the outset that entailed a massive, complex and long term 
regulatory alignment. Classical free trade arrangements of Europe Agreement type 
were a more appropriate first stage. These is because they were more feasible to 
introduce, and would have acted as stepping-stones towards and a learning process for 
deeper integration. Moreover, they could have encouraged more foreign direct 
investment, especially if accompanied by regional free trade agreement or enabling 
the other EaP countries to follow the example of Moldova which is a member of 
CEFTA.  The concept of Optimum Integration Area (OIA) developed by Dangerfield 
(2011) not only shows whether states are fit for membership at a specific time but also 
clearly suggests  that the traditional sequencing of steps towards EU integration 
would have been more suitable for the EaP countries. To give a brief explanation of 
the OIA first, it adapts the ‘Optimum Currency Area’ (OCA) concept, which 
identifies necessary conditions for a viable currency union, to the EU enlargement 
issue. The OCA approach stresses that economic profiles of prospective participants 
must be sufficiently converged, otherwise unsuitable partners will put intolerable 
strains on the whole system. Following the same principle, the OIA uses a number of 
indicators to determine whether potential members could be absorbed without 
compromising the integration project. Dangerfield’s model, which focused on the so-
called Western Newly Independent States (WNIS) took into account GDP per capita, 
freedom and human rights, quality of economic and business governance according to 
World Bank governance indicators and progress in post-communist economic 
transition as measured by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD). It clearly showed that even at the time of launch of the EaP, let alone the 
ENP, the WNIS at least were not in a fit state for deep integration with EU.  
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and the “Optimum Economic Area” 
 
 Income per head 
2008 ($) 
Freedom index 
2010 (pr/cl) 
Quality of 
economic 
regulation 
2008 transition 
rating  (EBRD)  
EU25 28497 1/1 1.38 - 
Iceland 36299 1/1 1.12 N/a 
Norway 49072 1/1 1.34 N/a 
Switz. 38031 1/1 1.66 N/a 
Ukraine (47.1 
million) 
6750 3/2 (free) -0.39 3.07 
Moldova (4.2 
million) 
2738 3/4 (partly 
Free) 
-0.20 3.0 
Belarus (9.8 
million) 
11329 7/6 (not 
Free) 
-1.24 2.04 
Romania 11704 2/2 0.53 3.44 
Bulgaria 11239 2/2 0.75 3.56 
 
 
Source: Dangerfield (2011) 
 
 
 
Contradictions between Neighbourhood Policy and the Strategy towards 
Russia 
 
The final argument rests on the assumption that relations between the EU and 
EaP countries are a sub-system of EU-Russia relations. One perspective on this is the 
Mearsheimer (revived) thesis that the EU has been complicit (with NATO) in creating 
a new grave security crisis in in the post Cold-War ‘multipolar’ Europe. This is 
through disregard for Russia’s perceived interests and pushing Euro-Atlantic 
structures to Russia’s front door. Again, this paper stresses a different contradiction 
and one that has played an important role in hampering EU support for EaP countries 
and undermines the ability of the EU to deal with the de-stabilising consequences of 
Europeanisation as noted above.  
 
The basic point to be stressed here is that the EU has promoted and supported 
Europeanisation in the ‘shared’ neighbourhood whilst simultaneously building strong 
economic interdependence with Russia.  EU companies have massively expanded 
exports to Russia since around 2000 and particularly after 2005. This of course was 
on the back of Russia’s oil-fired import boom: between 2005 and 2010 imports 
doubled from US $bn 79.7 to 197.5 US $bn (Dangerfield 2015). The relationship with 
Russia is obviously crucial to successful engagement with eastern neighbours, yet a 
ten year process of building economic interdependence with Russia means that trade 
considerations are at the heart of the difficulty of achieving a unified EU stance when 
it comes to economic statecraft towards Russia. Criticism of sanctions and some 
‘behind the scenes’ business as usual in some aspects of bilateral ties (see Dangerfield 
2015) are evidence of this. For example it was interesting to note that many leading 
not only US but also European multinational companies attended the annual ‘St 
Petersburg International Economic Forum in late June 2015. This was in marked 
contrast to 2014 when most stayed away. The decision of some member states (such 
as Hungary and Slovakia) to reconvene meetings of bilateral intergovernmental trade 
and economy commissions after having suspended them in 2014, is a further evidence 
that the complex web of EU-Russia trade and economic ties is well beyond the 
comprehensive control of the EU and that a multilateral approach to economic ties 
with Russia has clear parameters.  
 
To further illustrate this issue, we can point out that the new EU members states have 
also been significant participants in the overall EU export boom to Russia. Taking the 
three ‘small’ Visegrad states as an example, Viktor Orban and Robert Fico have been 
openly critical of EU sanctions on Russia and there have similar interventions by 
Czech President Milos Zeman. Rather than some kind of sudden political lurch 
towards Russia, this represents economic pragmatism based on the rather dramatic 
increase in the significance of the Russian market over the last decade or so. Table 2 
demonstrates the extent to which the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have all 
expanded exports to Russia since EU accession and also shows how this was set in the 
overall EU boom. Energy dependence is another important consideration for the three. 
The gas trade is well publicized, the nuclear energy issue less so. Table 3 shows the 
importance of nuclear energy for the three. Russia is the key partner in this sector 
(Dangerfield 2015). 
  
  
Table 2 
 
Czech, Hungarian and Slovak exports to Russia 2004-2013 (Euro, millions) 
 
 
 
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 INDEX 
2013/ 
2004 
Czech 
Exports 
770 1504 2911 2672 4760 4474 581 
Hung.  
Exports 
738 1617 2666 2583 2567 2538 344 
Slovak 
Exports 
271 549 1811 1933 2638 2457 906 
EU 27 
Exports 
46123 72400 104970 86308 123442 119780 260 
 
Source: Dangerfield (2015) 
 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Nuclear energy capacity in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia 
 
 No. of Soviet-built 
reactors 
Nuclear power as % of domestic 
electricity generation 
 
Czech Republic 
 
6 33% 
Hungary 
 
4 33% 
Slovakia 
 
4 55% 
 
Source: Dangerfield (2015) 
  
Conclusions 
 
            In 2016, ‘post-enlargement Europe’ largely reflected a successful expansion of 
the European security community. This has been based primarily on the internal 
transformations of CEE post-communist states and their absorption into the EU 
(alongside NATO expansion). Also, despite the ongoing challenges in the Western 
Balkans and inevitable longer term membership perspectives of many states in that 
region, no one could deny the role that European integration has played in pacifying 
and stabilising the former Yugoslavia. Whatever the eventual outcomes within the 
West Balkans, the contours of post-enlargement Europe suggest that the final limits of 
EU expansion are now known. This also means that the spread of the European 
security community may have also run aground, at least for the foreseeable future. 
There can be no doubt that at the present time the EU’s eastern neighbourhood looks 
more like an ‘insecurity zone’ plagued by open or frozen conflict.  
 
Does the failure to achieve successful spread of the European security community 
reflect the failure of EU policies or intractable complications of the eastern 
neighbourhood itself, including but not wholly down to, the Russia factor? Much 
more research will be needed on that key question in the future, but either way the 
Ukraine crisis and all its ramifications confirmed a widespread acceptance that the 
fundamental re-assessment of the ENP that took place during 2015 was long overdue.  
The European Commission’s November 2015 review of ENP stresses that 
differentiation and greater mutual ownership will be its hallmarks from now on 
(European Commission, 2015). The new approach appears to be more pragmatic and 
less based on the enlargement model than its predecessor but whether it will provide a 
more effective framework for EU engagement with its neighbours remains to be seen.   
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